In the present selection process for the CAG, it is the Government machinery which appoints the CAG on its own. This goes against its role of ensuring executive accountable.
Also, Union government appoints the CAG without any consultation from state governments. This goes against the principles of federalism.
There are currently no criteria available for selection of this constitutional post. People have no idea who all are shortlisted, on what basis final name was selected.
Conflict of interest while appointing CAG e.g. when former secretaries or administrators are appointed as CAG, the independence of the institution is seemed to be compromised e.g. GC Murmu’s appointment as CAG etc.
Post facto audit: Its report is post-facto i.e. CAG audits expenditure only after it has been incurred.
In India, CAG is not a member of the parliament while in Britain CAG is a member of house of the Commons.
Exceeding mandate: Some sections criticised CAG’s reports on 2G, Coal blocks allocation as beyond its jurisdiction and mandate. This has led to a situation of fear of the 3Cs – CBI, CAG and CVC. This promotes risk-averse attitude among the bureaucrats as auditors may not take into consideration the practical problems in the administration.
There is lack of economic expertise within CAG and Indian Audit and Accounts Service while auditing natural resources like coal etc.
The secret service expenditure is a limitation on the auditing role of the CAG. In this regard, the CAG cannot call for particulars of expenditure incurred by the executive agencies, but has to accept a certificate from the competent administrative authority that the expenditure has been so incurred under his authority.
Delay in supply of documents: Usually delayed and more often, the crucial documents are supplied to the auditors at the end of the audit programme. This is done with objective of obstructing meaningful audit of crucial records.
There has also been delays in the tabling the report of CAG in the Parliament.