UPSC Editorial Analysis: The Case for Regional Benches of the Supreme Court

General Studies-2; Topic: Structure, organization and functioning of the Executive and the Judiciary; Ministries and Departments of the Government; pressure groups and formal/informal associations and their role in the Polity.

Introduction

• The demand for a Southern Bench of the Supreme Court (SC) has been reignited by Karnataka Chief Minister, who emphasized that geographic distance should not be a barrier to justice.
• This issue is a recurring theme in Indian jurisprudence, touching upon constitutional mandates, economic equity, and administrative efficiency.

The Constitutional Foundation

The debate is primarily anchored in Article 130 of the Indian Constitution, which outlines the seat of the Supreme Court.

• Delhi as the Seat:
  • The Constitution designates Delhi as the permanent seat of the Supreme Court.
• The Power to Expand:
  • Importantly, Article 130 provides that the CJI, with the approval of the President, may appoint “such other place or places” as the seat of the Supreme Court.
• Interpretation:
  • While the provision exists, the Supreme Court has historically interpreted this as a discretionary power of the CJI. It is not a mandatory requirement that can be enforced by a writ of mandamus from a High Court or through government pressure alone.

The Current Crisis: Pendency and Accessibility

The argument for reform is driven by the sheer scale of the judicial burden and the inequalities it creates.

• The Pendency Peak:
  • According to the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG), the Supreme Court has crossed a historic threshold with over 92,000 pending cases as of March 2026.
• The “Distance Penalty”:
  • Litigants from southern, eastern, and northeastern states face a structural disadvantage. A citizen from Kerala or Assam must travel hundreds of kilometers, stay in Delhi, and often hire two sets of lawyers (one for the High Court and a “Supreme Court specialist” in Delhi).
• Data on Appeals:
  • Statistics show a clear bias. States closer to Delhi (like Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh) have a much higher rate of appeals in the SC. In contrast, while the Madras High Court or Karnataka High Court may dispose of thousands of cases, barely 10% are challenged in the SC, largely due to the prohibitive costs of travel and litigation in the capital.

Multiple Dimensions

• Legal and Constitutional Dimension

• • Right to Access Justice: Article 21 (Right to Life) has been interpreted by the SC to include the right to access justice. If distance makes the court inaccessible, this fundamental right is compromised.
  • Directive Principles (Article 39A): The State is mandated to provide “Equal Justice and Free Legal Aid.” Setting up regional benches is seen as a fulfillment of this Directive Principle.

• Socio-Economic Dimension

• • Economic Exclusion: High litigation costs in Delhi create a “class-based” justice system where only the wealthy or the State can afford to see a case through to the apex level.

• Structural and Administrative Dimension

• • Constitutional vs. Appellate Roles: Currently, the SC acts as both a Constitutional Court (interpreting the Constitution) and a Court of Appeal (dealing with routine civil and criminal matters).
  • The Cassation Model: The Law Commission has suggested splitting these roles. Regional benches could handle routine appeals (Cassation), while a dedicated Constitutional Bench in Delhi focuses on matters of national importance.

Key Recommendations: The Law Commission Reports

The demand for regional benches is not a political whim but is supported by decades of expert study:

• 95th Report (1984): Recommended dividing the SC into a Constitutional Division and a Legal Division.
• 125th Report (1988): Suggested that the SC should sit in benches outside Delhi to make it affordable.
• 229th Report (2009): This is the most comprehensive source. It proposed setting up four Cassation Benches in:
  1. Northern Region: Delhi
  2. Southern Region: Chennai or Hyderabad
  3. Eastern Region: Kolkata
  4. Western Region: Mumbai
• Rationale: This would “rationalize” the court’s workload. Delhi would remain the seat for the “Constitution Bench,” preserving the court’s national character while decentralizing its appellate function.

Arguments Against Regional Benches (Institutional Anxiety)

Despite the benefits, there is significant resistance from within the judiciary and the Delhi Bar.

• Risk of Conflicting Judgments:
  • Critics fear that different benches might interpret the same law differently, leading to legal chaos and uncertainty.
• Erosion of Unity:
  • There is an “institutional anxiety” that regional benches would turn the SC into a “diluted” version of its current self, making it look like an extended High Court rather than a singular national pillar.
• Logistical Challenges:
  • The cost of setting up infrastructure, security, and staffing in four different cities would be immense.
• Binding Precedent:
  • While mechanisms like “Reference to a larger bench” exist to resolve inconsistencies, critics argue this would only add more layers of delay.

The Global Context

Many large democracies have balanced central authority with regional accessibility:

• United States:
  • The US Supreme Court is centralized in Washington D.C., but it hears only ~80 cases a year. In contrast, the Indian SC is a “people’s court” that hears thousands of appeals, making the centralized model much harder to sustain.
• Germany & South Africa:
  • These countries have successfully separated their Constitutional Courts from their highest Courts of Appeal, often located in different cities.

Way Forward

To resolve the deadlock, a multi-pronged approach is needed:

• Implementing the 229th Report:
  • The government and the CJI should revisit the Cassation Bench model to separate routine appeals from constitutional matters.
• Virtual Benches:
  • In the interim, “Virtual Benches” can be expanded. The pandemic proved that high-quality hearings can occur via video conferencing. This allows southern litigants to stay in their home states while their cases are heard by SC judges in Delhi.
• Circuit Benches:
  • Instead of permanent seats, the SC could hold “Circuit sittings” in different zones for specific periods in a year, a practice already followed by many High Courts and Tribunals.
• National Courts of Appeal:
  • There is a proposal to create a “National Court of Appeal” between the High Courts and the Supreme Court. This court would have regional branches to handle all final appeals, leaving the SC to deal only with the most critical constitutional questions.

Conclusion

• Decentralization is not about diminishing the “Majesty of the Court”; it is about restoring the promise of “Equal Justice for All” as enshrined in the Preamble.
• For the Indian judiciary to remain relevant and trusted, it must bridge the gap between the citizen and the courtroom, regardless of the distance from New Delhi.