EDITORIAL ANALYSIS : India-China: between pre-1962 and now

 

Source: The Hindu

 

  • Prelims: Current events of international importance(LAC, Macmohan line, Galwan, 1962 war etc)
  • Mains GS Paper II: Bilateral, regional and global grouping involving India, Significance of Indo-Pacific for India etc

 

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS

  • The clash between Indian troops and the Chinese PLA at Galwan in 2020 and the recent altercation between troops at Yangtse in Arunachal Pradesh have highlighted the lingering boundary dispute as well as the complex Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Current Affairs

 

INSIGHTS ON THE ISSUE

Context

REASONS FOR THE 1962 WAR:

  • Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh: The main reason for the Indo-China war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions.
  • Claim over territories: India claimed Aksai Chin to be the part of Ladakh whereas China claimed it as the part of Xinjiang.
  • Aloofness about Chinese activities at the border: India remained unaware that this area was already in use by China.
    • The Chinese had built a 220-km-long road there only after the completion of the project was announced in 1957.
  • In the eastern sector: the McMahon Line had been drawn in 1914 without even a survey.

Events that led to the War:

  • Panchsheel agreement (1954): It ousted India out of Tibet and China found the time right to enforce its territorial claims along the Indian border.
  • Misconception: Chinese initial intrusions were dismissed by India as minor incidents, while the intrusions continued.
  • Kongka pass incident (1959):Nine Indian policemen were killed, and the government held China responsible, creating a sense of betrayal in the public.
    • The border problem builded into armed conflict in 1962.
  • Ceasefire: India did not respond positively to the Chinese suggestion to create a demilitarized zone to avoid future conflicts.
    • The two countries were left without an agreed line separating them.
  • Chinese claim over the eastern sector as part of any settlement, while holding on to the western sector.

 

Dispute between India and China in 1950’s:(territorial dispute):

  • Whole of Aksai Chin claimed by India
  • Whole of NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) is claimed by China.

 

Present disputes:

  • Western sector (Ladakh)(China is seeking claims).
    • Trig Heights in the Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) area
    • Demchok in the south
    • The Depsang Bulge
    • Galwan
    • Pangong Lake and Hot Springs
  • Middle (central sector):
    • Barahoti pasture north of Chamoli in Uttarakhand
  • Eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh):
    • The international boundary and the LAC are defined by the 1914 McMahon Line
    • China seeks to make inroads:
      • Tawang sector
      • Upper Subansiri region
      • Tri-junction with Myanmar.

 

Traditional Chinese stand:

  • Advantage: China has enjoyed an advantage in terms of terrain and logistics on the high plateau of Tibet.
  • China has always projected a spurious interpretation of the LAC: shied away from clarifying its position through an exchange of large-scale maps.

 

Similarities and differences on the issue compared to the past:

  • Similarity :
    • Both periods involve contention over frontier tracts which underwent redefinition
  • Differences:
    • The focus is primarily on the LAC as against the larger boundary dispute.
    • In the 1950s, China had yet to reveal its true bias in favor of Pakistan, including on Kashmir.
    • China openly works in tandem with Pakistan against India’s interests to internationalize the issue at the UN.
    • In 1962: India was forced to approach the U.S. and other Western countries for military assistance to meet the Chinese challenge.
    • In the current phase: India has rapidly inducted new weapon systems albeit with heavy emphasis on Atmanirbhar Bharat(self-reliance) in defense manufacturing.
    • Political will of the government and the determination of the Indian army to block Chinese patrols, and not just in Yangtse.

 

Role of China’s internal vulnerabilities to bilateral relations with India:

  • Tibet: It has remained a source of insecurity for China.
  • Mao Zedong adopted an aggressive stance towards India as a means of consolidating his leadership to avoid internal challenges and avoiding censure of disastrous political and economic policies.
  • Xi Jinping: Facing mounting scrutiny for the dreadful Zero-COVID policy, and growing authoritarianism.
  • The tendency to create external diversions is a common thread.

 

LAC:

  • The LAC between India and China, is frequently open to challenge by either side.
  • Areas along the LAC have been patrolled by both sides in the past.
  • The Chinese ingress in Sumdorong Chu valley in the Tawang sector in 1986-87 resulted in a close confrontation that lasted eight years.
  • In 1995, two sides pulled back: India relocating its Jaya and Negi posts on the south side of the Hathungla-Lungrola ridgeline.

 

Way Forward

  • Diplomatic talks: Since the Galwan incident, the two sides have disengaged at multiple friction points even as military and diplomatic talks continue to find a way out of the impasse at Depsang and Demchok.
  • India’s Endeavour to engage China has been in keeping with India’s broader world vision of good-neighborly and peaceful ties, inclusive growth and development.
  • China’s vision is contrarian to India: It seeks to build a China-centric hierarchy with scant regard for notions of equality and multipolarity.

 

QUESTION FOR PRACTICE

Q. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is transforming itself into a trade block from the military alliance, in present times. Discuss (UPSC 2020) (200 WORDS, 10 MARKS)