Insta–DART (Daily Aptitude and Reasoning Test) 9 January 2021

The greens’ success has clear policy implications, especially on issues of nuclear power, ecological tax reform and citizenship rights. But success also has implications for parties themselves. Greens have always faced a unique ‘strategic conundrum’ arising from their unique beliefs and movement roots. Put simply, how can they reconcile their radical alternative politics with participation in mainstream or ‘grey’ parliamentary and government structures? Throughout the 1990s most parties shed their radical cloth in an attempt to capture votes, even at the expense of party unity and purity. Most were rewarded with electoral success well beyond what had been imaginable in the 1980s. The price to pay has been tortured internal debates about strategy, and new questions about green party identity and purpose. Today the key questions facing green parties revolve around not whether to embrace power, but what to do with it. More especially, green parties face three new challenges in the new millennium: First, how to carve out a policy niche as established parties and governments become wiser to green demands, and as green concerns themselves appear more mainstream. Second, how to take green ideas beyond the confines of rich industrialised states into Eastern Europe and the developing world where green parties remain marginal and environmental problems acute. Third, how to ensure that the broader role of green parties – as consciousness raisers, agitators, conscience of parliament and politics – is not sacrificed on the altar of electoral success. Green parties have come a long way since their emergence and development in the 1970s and 1980s. They have become established players able to shape party competition, government formation and government policy. But this very ‘establishment’ carries risks for a party whose core values and identities depend mightily on their ability to challenge the conventional order, to agitate and to annoy. For most green parties, the greatest fear is not electoral decline so much as the prospect of becoming a party with parliamentary platform, ministerial voice, but nothing new to say.

Which out of the following is closest in meaning to the first of three challenges mentioned in the Paragraph?

The greens’ success has clear policy implications, especially on issues of nuclear power, ecological tax reform and citizenship rights. But success also has implications for parties themselves. Greens have always faced a unique ‘strategic conundrum’ arising from their unique beliefs and movement roots. Put simply, how can they reconcile their radical alternative politics with participation in mainstream or ‘grey’ parliamentary and government structures? Throughout the 1990s most parties shed their radical cloth in an attempt to capture votes, even at the expense of party unity and purity. Most were rewarded with electoral success well beyond what had been imaginable in the 1980s. The price to pay has been tortured internal debates about strategy, and new questions about green party identity and purpose. Today the key questions facing green parties revolve around not whether to embrace power, but what to do with it. More especially, green parties face three new challenges in the new millennium: First, how to carve out a policy niche as established parties and governments become wiser to green demands, and as green concerns themselves appear more mainstream. Second, how to take green ideas beyond the confines of rich industrialised states into Eastern Europe and the developing world where green parties remain marginal and environmental problems acute. Third, how to ensure that the broader role of green parties – as consciousness raisers, agitators, conscience of parliament and politics – is not sacrificed on the altar of electoral success. Green parties have come a long way since their emergence and development in the 1970s and 1980s. They have become established players able to shape party competition, government formation and government policy. But this very ‘establishment’ carries risks for a party whose core values and identities depend mightily on their ability to challenge the conventional order, to agitate and to annoy. For most green parties, the greatest fear is not electoral decline so much as the prospect of becoming a party with parliamentary platform, ministerial voice, but nothing new to say.

Which of the following is the most important point that author highlights?

The greens’ success has clear policy implications, especially on issues of nuclear power, ecological tax reform and citizenship rights. But success also has implications for parties themselves. Greens have always faced a unique ‘strategic conundrum’ arising from their unique beliefs and movement roots. Put simply, how can they reconcile their radical alternative politics with participation in mainstream or ‘grey’ parliamentary and government structures? Throughout the 1990s most parties shed their radical cloth in an attempt to capture votes, even at the expense of party unity and purity. Most were rewarded with electoral success well beyond what had been imaginable in the 1980s. The price to pay has been tortured internal debates about strategy, and new questions about green party identity and purpose. Today the key questions facing green parties revolve around not whether to embrace power, but what to do with it. More especially, green parties face three new challenges in the new millennium: First, how to carve out a policy niche as established parties and governments become wiser to green demands, and as green concerns themselves appear more mainstream. Second, how to take green ideas beyond the confines of rich industrialised states into Eastern Europe and the developing world where green parties remain marginal and environmental problems acute. Third, how to ensure that the broader role of green parties – as consciousness raisers, agitators, conscience of parliament and politics – is not sacrificed on the altar of electoral success. Green parties have come a long way since their emergence and development in the 1970s and 1980s. They have become established players able to shape party competition, government formation and government policy. But this very ‘establishment’ carries risks for a party whose core values and identities depend mightily on their ability to challenge the conventional order, to agitate and to annoy. For most green parties, the greatest fear is not electoral decline so much as the prospect of becoming a party with parliamentary platform, ministerial voice, but nothing new to say.

How best can mainstream political parties, in India, keep green parties at bay?

One key element of Kantian ethics is the idea that the moral worth of any action relies entirely on the motivation of the agent: Human behaviour cannot be said good or bad in light of the consequences it generates, but only with regard to what moved the agent to act in that particular way. Kant introduces the key concept of duty to clarify the rationale underpinning of his moral theory, by analysing different types of motivation. First of all, individuals commit actions that are really undertaken for the sake of duty itself, which is done because the agent thinks they are the right thing to do. No consideration of purpose of the action matters, but only whether the action respects a universal moral law. Another form of action (motivation) originates from immediate inclination: Everyone has some inclinations, such as to preserve one’s life, or to preserve honour. These are also duties that have worth in their own sake. But acting according to the maxim that these inclinations might suggest – such as taking care of one’s own health lacks for Kant true moral worth. For example, a charitable person who donates some goods to poor people might do it following her inclination to help the others- that is, because she enjoys helping the others. Kant does not consider it as moral motivation, even if the action is in conformity with duty. The person acting from duty would in fact donate to the other because she recognises that helping the others is her moral obligation. Final type of motivation suggested by Kant include actions that can be done in conformity with duty, yet are not done from duty, but rather as a mean to some further end. In order to illustrate this type of motivation, Kant provides the following example. A shopkeeper who does not overcharge the inexperienced customer and treats all customers in the same way certainly Is doing the right thing – that is, acts in conformity with duty – but we cannot say for sure that he is acting in this way because he is moved by the basic principles of honesty: ‘It is his advantage that requires it’. Moreover, we cannot say that he is moved by an immediate inclination towards his customers, since he gives no preference to one with respect to another. Therefore, concludes Kant, ‘his action was done neither from duty nor from immediate inclination but merely tor purposes of self-interest’.

Consider the following examples:

• • • Red Cross Volunteer who donates blood every year to thank an anonymous donor who saved the life of his mother some time back
    • A voluntary organisation which conducts regular blood donation camps to improve its legitimacy.

As per the passage, correct statement(s) related to the above examples would be:

1. 1. The source of motivation for both examples is same.
   2. Individuals may commit actions for reasons beyond duty.
   3. Both examples illustrate the concept of moral worth.

One key element of Kantian ethics is the idea that the moral worth of any action relies entirely on the motivation of the agent: Human behaviour cannot be said good or bad in light of the consequences it generates, but only with regard to what moved the agent to act in that particular way. Kant introduces the key concept of duty to clarify the rationale underpinning of his moral theory, by analysing different types of motivation. First of all, individuals commit actions that are really undertaken for the sake of duty itself, which is done because the agent thinks they are the right thing to do. No consideration of purpose of the action matters, but only whether the action respects a universal moral law. Another form of action (motivation) originates from immediate inclination: Everyone has some inclinations, such as to preserve one’s life, or to preserve honour. These are also duties that have worth in their own sake. But acting according to the maxim that these inclinations might suggest – such as taking care of one’s own health lacks for Kant true moral worth. For example, a charitable person who donates some goods to poor people might do it following her inclination to help the others- that is, because she enjoys helping the others. Kant does not consider it as moral motivation, even if the action is in conformity with duty. The person acting from duty would in fact donate to the other because she recognises that helping the others is her moral obligation. Final type of motivation suggested by Kant include actions that can be done in conformity with duty, yet are not done from duty, but rather as a mean to some further end. In order to illustrate this type of motivation, Kant provides the following example. A shopkeeper who does not overcharge the inexperienced customer and treats all customers in the same way certainly Is doing the right thing – that is, acts in conformity with duty – but we cannot say for sure that he is acting in this way because he is moved by the basic principles of honesty: ‘It is his advantage that requires it’. Moreover, we cannot say that he is moved by an immediate inclination towards his customers, since he gives no preference to one with respect to another. Therefore, concludes Kant, ‘his action was done neither from duty nor from immediate inclination but merely tor purposes of self-interest’.

1. 1. Which of the following inferences would be against the ideas in the passage?
   2. Kantian ethics considers the moral worth of an inclination on the basis of its consequence.
   3. Actions motivated by the inclination of an individual lack moral worth.
   4. Elements of moral obligation reduce the moral worth of a duty, which has some worth in itself.